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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v, : 
ALBERT JAMES GROSSI, : Case No. 20020151 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State makes two principal arguments in this case. First, the State argues that 
Officer Jason Knight's original entry into Appellant Albert James Grossi's apartment is 
justified because Mr. Grossi consented to the entry. Appellee's Br. 8-9. Second, the State 
argues that Officer's Knight's subsequent "sweep" of the apartment is justified by exigent 
circumstances. Appellee's Br. 16. 
While neither of these arguments is correct, the State covers very little that was not 
already explored in the opening brief. So, Mr. Grossi restricts this reply to two sub-issues 
not previously addressed. 
First, Mr. Grossi responds to the State's suggestion that, even if he did not consent 
to Officer Knight's entry, the entry was justified because it was reasonable. The 
reasonableness standard is an inappropriately moderate standard which does not apply in 
this case. And, the State supports its argument only with cases involving the inventorying 
of impounded automobiles. But here, the officer did not impound an automobile, he 
illegally entered a home. So, a stringent standard of review applies. 
Second, Mr. Grossi responds to the State's heavy reliance upon Officer Knight's 
subjective feelings of apprehension to justify the "sweep" of the apartment. Appellee's 
Br. 21-22. As will be shown, such feelings are simply not enough to support of finding of 
exigent circumstances. Such feelings are nothing more than a hunch, and a hunch is not 
enough to justify a warrantless intrusion into a home. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO MR. GROSSPS HOME CANNOT BE 
JUSTIFIED BY LABELING IT A CARETAKING FUNCTION 
The State argues that cases emphasizing the need for unambiguous consent to 
enter a home are not on point,1 and then urges this Court to accept the idea that home 
1
 The State attempts to distinguish cases cited by Mr. Grossi by claiming they are 
factually different or by implying that they have been rejected in Utah. However, all of these 
claims are either incorrect or irrelevant. 
Specifically, the State erroneously claims that the 10th Circuit case of State v. Iribe does 
not apply in this case because it involves a portion of the "voluntariness" standard rejected by 
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court. Appellee's Br. 14 n.6 (citing 
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073). However, the issue in this case is not whether the 
consent was voluntary, but whether there was consent at all. Furthermore, Iribe addresses the 
issue of consent, United States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1556 (10th Cir. 1993), and so it is 
appropriately applied here. Also, Iribe is not part of the "voluntariness" test rejected in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). In fact, it applies the "totality of 
circumstances" test from Schneckloth, and emphasizes that the burden is on the government to 
show, first, that consent was given, and second, that it was freely given. Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557. 
The case mentioned by the State, State v. Bisner, does not specifically reject Iribe or its holdings. 
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J47, 37 P.3d 1073. And so, the State's argument is incorrect. 
Also, the State claims that the holdings of Bumper v. North Carolina are not on point 
because, there, the police entered the home by a claim of authority, and they did not do that here. 
2 
entries are legal if they are reasonable. Appellee's Br. 13-16. However, the State confuses 
the standard applicable to inventorying an impounded car with the warrantless intrusion 
into a home. A warrantless intrusion into a home may be justified only if the intrusion 
falls into one of the specific, well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. 
Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). This standard is equivalent to that of probable 
cause. Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). Conversely, when the police 
impound a car after arresting the driver for an offense, the much-lower reasonableness 
standard applies. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1976). 
There are several reasons for this. One reason involves the inherent mobility of 
automobiles. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, this mobility gives rise to 
practical circumstances which make the rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement 
impossible. Id at 367. Another reason is that people simply have a lower expectation of 
privacy in their automobiles than in their homes. Id, Automobiles are subject to extensive 
regulation and controls, involving both the condition and operation of the car. Id at 368. 
Appellee's Br. 13-14. However, the holdings of Bumper are on point. These holdings are that the 
government has the burden of showing that consent was given, and that it was freely given. 
Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). These general holdings are not 
inapplicable simply because this case is not factually identical to Bumper. 
Finally, the State claims that the 10th Circuit case of United States v. Salinas-Cano is not 
on point because it involved consent given by someone other than the owner of the searched 
suitcase. Appellee's Br. 14. That is not the case here. Id. However, Salinas-Cano is cited for its 
general holdings that the government has the burden of proving consent, and the consent cannot 
be ambiguous. United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 862-64 (10th Cir. 1992). These 
holdings apply here, and a factual difference between Salinas-Cano and this case does not make 
these holdings any less pertinent. 
3 
"It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view," and may cause public hazards. Id. (quotations omitted). So, people cannot expect 
the same level of privacy in their automobiles as in their homes. Finally, police are often 
required to take automobiles into custody as part of their "community caretaking 
functions." Icl (quotations omitted). And when they do so, the automobiles may be 
subject to routine inventorying practices. L± at 369. 
Needless to say, none of these conditions exist with regard to people's homes. In 
fact, the very cases which the State cites for support strongly emphasize that the 
automobile inventorying holdings do not apply to the entry and search of homes: 
This Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and 
homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment. Although 
automobiles are "effects" and thus within the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment... warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld 
in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not. 
Id at 367 (citations omitted). This is because protecting the home from illegal 
government intrusion is the driving force behind the Fourth Amendment. This has 
frequently been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, 
and this Court. Indeed, this Court acknowledges that "[p]hysical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (1993). Also, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he 
primary protection afforded citizens against official, arbitrary intrusions into their homes 
and other private places is the requirement of a search warrant issued by a magistrate on 
proof that probable cause exists to invade a person's privacy." State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 
4 
188, 194 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[a] greater burden 
is placed . . . on officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom from 
intrusion into the home or swelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by 
the Fourth Amendment." Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1979). In sum, courts 
have always treated the intrusion into homes differently than the intrusion into 
automobiles. 
Nonetheless, the State seizes upon the idea that Officer Knight was merely 
performing a car-impounding-type "caretaking function" by entering Mr. Grossi's home, 
and that the reasonableness standard applies. Appellee's Br. 15. This argument should not 
be given any credence. The community caretaking function of the police should never be 
confused with the officers' duty to abide by the constitution after arresting someone 
outside of his home. Indeed, the car-impounding cases themselves warn that the 
"caretaking" label should never be inappropriately applied to justify an illegal search. 
Oppermam 428 U.S. at 373-76. And, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
the community caretaking function is "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, 
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."2 In this case, the 
police were investigating a report of domestic violence, R. 168 [5-7], not impounding a 
car. And, there is nothing to show that the car-impounding cases apply, or that the 
2
 Cadv v. Dombrowski. 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). See also United States v. Rodriguez-
Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the community caretaking rationale 
should not be extended beyond its original purpose); United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 636 
(10th Cir. 1992) (court refuses to justify search of door pocket of car on basis that it was part of a 
community caretaking function). 
5 
justifications from these cases apply to people's homes. And so, the State's argument that 
the reasonableness standard applies should be rejected. 
II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, AN OFFICER'S 
HUNCH CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A FINDING OF EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
The exigent circumstances exception to the rule that officers must have a search 
warrant to enter a home cannot be supported by an officer's instinctive feeling that 
something may be wrong. There must be much more. Indeed, this Court has recently 
declared that the exigent circumstances doctrine "should be strictly circumscribed" 
because it is a significant departure from the Fourth Amendment. State v. Comer, 2002 
UT App 219,^17, 51 P.3d 55. 
This means that, at a minimum, the State must prove that the officer had an 
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed and there was an 
immediate need to enter.3 In other words, there must have been circumstances "that 
would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent 
physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
3
 Id at f 5 n.l (quoting Salt Lake City v. Davidson. 2000 UT App 12, f 10-13, 994 P.2d 
1283). Notably, there are two other requirements that must be met before a finding of exigent 
circumstances may be made. Namely, that "[t]he search is not primarily motived by intent to 
arrest and seize evidence; [and] [tjhere is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with 
the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched 
and the emergency." Id. 
6 
enforcement efforts." Id at <p4 (quotations omitted). Importantly, this standard 
emphasizes that a reasonable person, not just a specially-trained law enforcer, must 
believe there is an emergency. It is an objective, not subjective, standard. In short, "a 
police officer's subjective beliefs are not the benchmark." State v. Wright 1999 UT App 
86,^8, 977 P.2d 505. 
Of course, police are not required to ignore their training and knowledge in 
determining whether there are exigent circumstances. If officers discern something, either 
because of their training or their personal knowledge of a situation, which would indicate 
to a reasonable person that an emergency or other urgency is in progress, this, along with 
other facts, could support a finding of exigent circumstances. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 
531, 535 (Utah 1994). However, the thing discerned must be a thing that, if known by an 
ordinary person, would cause the ordinary person to believe that an emergency exists.4 It 
4
 Id at 534-35; Comer, 2002 UT App. 219,1(24-25. One example of this is the case of 
State v. Ramirez, in which this Court found that exigent circumstances supported an officer's 
intrusion into a home. In that case, an officer had been called to hasten his response to a request 
for back-up in handling a "drunk" near Trolley Square in Salt Lake City. State v. Ramirez, 814 
P.2d 1131,1132 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When he arrived, he found two men fleeing on foot, 
pursued by another police officer. Id at 1133. One man fell down and was apprehended. IdL 
However, the back-up officer continued chasing the second man, and chased him into a nearby 
house. Id. Inside the house the officer was confronted by a small, frenzied dog. Id Another 
officer arrived to assist, and they eventually chased the dog out of the house and arrested the 
second man. 
Later, it appeared that the man who had fallen was the principal perpetrator, and the man 
who had run into the house was a peripheral figure. Id. at 1133-34. 
However, this Court held that the intrusion into the home was justified by exigent 
circumstances. Id at 1134. In making its holding, this Court noted that the back-up officer, by 
virtue of his nineteen years of police experience, knew that calls to hasten back-up "usually 
indicated that the on-scene officer was being assaulted or that other serious problems were 
7 
cannot be a mere feeling of trouble. This is a hunch and a hunch does not support a 
finding of exigent circumstances, even if the hunch is made by a trained law enforcement 
officer.5 
Further, an emergency or other urgency won't generally require interpretation by a 
specialized law enforcer. The cases in which exigent circumstances have been found 
involve readily discernable emergencies or other urgencies. For instance, exigent 
circumstances exist where a raging fire prompts entry by firefighters,6 a crime suspect 
begins to destroy crucial evidence,7 the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect,8 or a parent 
telephones 911 to report a child's injury and request emergency assistance. State v. 
Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
developing." Id. at 1132. Therefore, when he arrived and observed the on-scene officer pursing 
two men, it was reasonable to believe that both men had committed offenses. Id. at 1134. This 
Court also emphasized that "a reasonable and prudent person" would have believed that both 
men had committed offenses. Id 
5
 See Wright. 1999 UT App 86, f 8 ("Probable cause is present when the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.") (quotations omitted); State v. White. 856 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The Terry Court refused to sanction any intrusion based 
on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.") (quotations omitted); State v. 
Baumgaertel. 762 P.2d 2, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("The officer's good faith is not enough . . . 
and his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, by itself, is insufficient to justify such 
a stop.") (quotations omitted). 
6
 See Michigan v. Clifford. 464 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1984) (although fire justified 
firefighters' entry into home, investigator's entry into home half a day after the fire was 
extinguished was not justified). 
7
 Illinois v. McArthur. 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001); State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-
60 (Utah 1987); Citvof Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
8
 State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
8 
What is more, the standard of proof for demonstrating that exigent circumstances 
existed is high. Reasonable suspicion does not justify the entry. State v. Beavers, 859 
P.2d 9, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Nor does mere nervousness on the part of an occupant.9 
Only a strong showing that exigent circumstances exists justifies the entry. This 
prosecutorial burden is heavy, but it is necessary because of the constitutional prohibition 
against warrantless intrusion into homes and the abhorrence that we as a society have for 
such practices.10 
Yet, in this case, the State has proven almost nothing to support its assertion that 
exigent circumstances existed. It merely states that, although an "untrained observer" may 
not see exigent circumstances, Officer Knight, by virtue of his experience and training, 
saw them. Appellee's Br. 20. Nothing else is specified other than that Chandra Karren 
emerged from the bedroom as he tried to lock Mr. Grossi's door, and she appeared 
nervous.11 This is simply not enough. 
9
 See Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1258 ("Generally, exigency does not evolve from one individual 
fact. Instead, there is often a mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient. Our 
task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine if 
the finding of exigency was proper.") 
10
 Beavers. 859 P.2d at 13. In Beavers, this Court pointed out that "[p]hysical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . . " Id. 
Therefore, "warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other private premises are per se 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.... Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold 
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. (quotations omitted). 
11
 Appellee's Br. 19-21. The State also cites the fact that this is a domestic violence case 
and reviews the events that occurred before Mr. Grossi's arrest. Appellee's Br. 19. However, 
these events had ended with Mr. Grossi's arrest. It was not until after the arrest that Officer 
Knight took it upon himself to lock the apartment door. R. 167 [9]. So, these events are 
irrelevant to the issue of whether exigent circumstances justified Officer Knight's sweep of the 
9 
Certainly, it is far cry from those cases which have found that exigent 
circumstances justified entry. One case, State v. Comer, is on point. In that case, this 
Court considered whether exigent circumstances justified entry into a home where a 
domestic dispute was allegedly in progress. Comer. 2002 UT App 219, ^[24-26. The 
officers had knocked on the door and it was opened only a few inches. Id,, at [^2. Then a 
woman, Misty Comer, stepped out onto the porch. Id, She told the officers that her 
husband was inside and then, "without explanation, immediately turned and walked back 
inside the residence." Id. (quotations omitted). The officers followed her into the home 
and down the hallway to a bedroom. Id. at ^3. Ms. Comer looked into the bedroom and 
told her husband that the police were there. IdL Mr. Comer came out and the officers 
observed scratches on his chest, neck, and back. Id Ms. Comer admitted scratching Mr. 
Comer. Id. The officers arrested her for domestic violence assault, and in the course of 
making that arrest, found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. at ^ [4. 
In reviewing the case, this Court first found that the "emergency aid" doctrine, in 
which warrantless entry into a home is justified by the need to render medical assistance, 
did not apply. Id at [^19. The Court also explained that a report of domestic violence was 
simply not enough to support the entry: 
Properly circumscribed, the emergency aid doctrine does not apply to the 
facts of this case because the information available to the police was 
insufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, 
apartment. Further, this Court has emphasized that a report of domestic violence does not 
support "an objectively reasonable belief that a person has been seriously injured." Comer. 2002 
UT App 219,^20. 
10 
semi-conscious, or missing person feared injured or dead might be in the 
Comers' home. On the contrary, the only information the officers had was a 
report of a family fight in progress, Misty's indication her husband was 
home, and Misty's "somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the 
house. 
14 
Significantly, this Court refused to make an automatic inference of danger solely 
on the basis of a reliable report of domestic violence: 
We decline to adopt a rule whereby a reliable domestic disturbance report, 
by itself, would be viewed as supporting an objectively reasonable belief 
that a person has been seriously injured. Rather, we conclude there must be 
some reliable and specific indication of the probability that a person is 
suffering from a serious physical injury before application of the medical 
emergency doctrine is justified. Here even in light of the "family fight in 
progress" report, Misty's actions, although suspicious, did not reasonably 
suggest an immediate medical emergency of the degree necessary to trigger 
the emergency aid doctrine. 
Id at 1f20. 
Then this Court moved on to the closely-related question of whether the entry was 
justified by exigent circumstances, which are those in which a reasonable person may 
believe that entry is necessary to prevent physical harm, the destruction of evidence, or an 
escape. Id. at ^ [24. In examining that issue, this Court called this "a close case," and 
ultimately concluded that there were exigent circumstances. Id at ^ 25. In so holding, this 
Court explained that, if the police have probable cause to believe that domestic violence 
is in progress or has just occurred, there are exigent circumstances. Id. at ^ |27. This Court 
expressly rejected a more liberal approach which would allow warrantless entry after a 
"corroborated anonymous report of a domestic dispute." Id at n.l 1. This Court also 
11 
rejected an approach which allows a report of domestic violence to act as a per se exigent 
circumstance. IdL 
In sum, this Court has held that only the high standard of probable cause that 
domestic violence is being or has been committed allows entry into a home under the 
exigent circumstances doctrine.12 And, while an officer's experience may be relevant 
insofar as it brings to light articulable bases for a belief that illegal activity is in progress, 
a general feeling of trouble is not enough. Probable cause exists: 
where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219 ^[21. This, at a minimum, requires that the officer be able to 
articulate sound bases for believing that domestic violence is in progress or has just 
ended. 
In this case, there are no sound, articulable bases for Officer Knight's sweep of the 
apartment. Of course, had a victim called out in pain from the bedroom, or shouting was 
heard, or something similar occurred, this case would be different. But that did not 
happen. There was nothing other than Ms. Karren's nervousness. And so, a finding of 
exigent circumstances is not supported, and Officer Knight's sweep of the apartment 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
12
 Id at 1f27. See also Beavers, 859 P.2d at 15 ("We view the Santana Court's articulation 
of the hot pursuit doctrine as nothing more than a specific application of the general rule that a 




In sum, Mr. Grossi requests that this Court reverse Mr. Grossi's conviction and 
remand this case with instructions to suppress the evidence that resulted from the police 
officers' unconstitutional search and seizure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3*+ day of January, 2003. 
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